US defense sponsored the DES program in 1971 and released it on 1977. It remained as a well-known and well-accepted defacto standard of block ciphers until 1998. Thirty-two 4-bit DES S-Boxes are grouped in eight each having four and are put in public domain without any mention of their design methodology. Due to this discovery of substitution Boxes, SBoxes, 4-bit, 8-bit or 32-bit, find a permanent seat in all future block ciphers. In this paper, a brief study on Crypto relevant properties of 4-bit Boolean Functions as well as 4-bit S-Boxes has been elaborated. The design Methodology of 32 4-bit DES S-Boxes have been of keen interest of this paper. The methodology of such 4-bit DES S-boxes that remained unturned due to the interference of NIST, have also been elaborated in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
Through the initiative of US defence since 1974 [1] , the Data Encryption Standard (DES), a cryptographic block ciphering module, was developed and released in 1977. Feistel and Coppersmith, who designed the earlier Lucifer block cipher [2] , took a leading role in DES design [3] and a team of researchers at IBM participated in its development. In early seventies, Feistel first conceived the idea of a modern computer-based block cipher [4] , [5] and developed Lucifer with many variants in terms of key-text pairs as (48-bit each), (64-bit and 32-bit) and (128-bit each) [6] the first one was used in electronic banking. Among all the variants, the 128-bit pair was considered best because of its large key size. During seventies and eighties, many elite researchers used to consider that DES is prone to brute-force attack [7] , [8] , [9] since it has only 56-bit key to encrypt 64-bit text. The DES was a permutation and substitution based bit-level encryption algorithm. All permutation and substitution tables used in DES were put in public domain along with the algorithm, but with no mention of their design methodology. This created a strong feeling among researchers [10] , [11] that by suppressing the design rule the government desires to gain an edge in eavesdropping to private messages and the feeling became so pervasive that with time a consortium took shape to break DES. In 1990, Biham and Shamir [12] reported breaking DES following a differential cryptanalysis and in 1993, Matsui [13] reported the same by linear cryptanalysis. In 1998, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, following a call from RSA Data Security [14] , spent $2.5 million to build a dedicated "Deep Crack" hardware based on VLSI technology and searched the DES encryption key within 56 hours [15] . Good reports on history of breaking DES appeared in [16] , It is interesting to note that in 2006 an identical initiative based on FPGA technology achieved the same goal with much less cost [18] . 
DESIGN METHODOLOGY ADOPTED FOR DES S-BOXES

Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) of a Boolean Function (BF)
A Boolean Function (BF) with 4-bit input providing 1-bit output is a mapping from (0,1)4 to (0, 1). Possible input combinations for 4 bits are 24 = 16, and this gives 16 coefficients of ANF, bf(x) as, bf (x) = ac + (a0x0 + a1x1 + a2 x2 + a3x3) + ( a4 x0x1+ a5 x0 x2+ a6 x0 x3+ a7 x1 x2+ a8 x1 x3 + a9 x2 x3) + (a10 x0 x1 x2 + a11 x0 x1 x3 + a12 x0 x2 x3 + a13 x1 x2 x3) + a14 x0 x1 x2 x3.
where, x represents 4-bit input {x3x2x1x0}, bf assumes 1bit output and '+' represents XOR operation. Here ac is a constant coefficient, a0, a1, a2 and a3 are four 1-bit linear coefficients, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8 and a9 are six 2-bit non-linear coefficients, a10, a11, a 12 and a13 are 3-bit non-linear coefficients and a14 is a 4-bit non-linear coefficient. A 4-bit truth [4] ^a [8] ^a [5] ^a [9] [8] ^a [3] ^a [9] ^a [10] ^a [4] ^a [5] ^a [6] ^a [7] ^a [11] [21] first introduced the idea of SAC, by stating that every output bit should change with a probability ½, in the event one input variable of a Boolean function is complemented. The probability of changing each output bit being ½ indicates extreme uncertainty in predicting a particular output bit to change. This is the theoretical essence of SAC. On inspecting the bit patterns of all the 16 bits of x3, x2, x1, x0, one notes that these are '00ff', '0f0f', '3333' and '5555' respectively in hex. The following algorithm in effect executes the SAC searching criterion of {bf} on complementing x3 vectors,
Similarly, for identical purpose, one has to right shift 'bf' by 4 for x2, for x1 by 2 and for x0 by 1 and execute the above algorithm as,
According to Traveres [19] 
2 NL BFs and (output) Bit Independence Criterion (BIC): BIC for a SBox.
By (output) Bit Independence Criterion, it is to be ensured that the output bit i of one BF and output bit j of another BF act independent of each other, i.e. bit i and j are not correlated to each other [20] . If both the two BFs are linear, any twooutput bits of the two linear BFs change with a correlation of ±1 indicating that xor of i and j should change with probability 1 or 0. i. e. either it remains same or flips. This indicates that the issue of nonlinearity of BF is closely related to BIC. One can look for the satisfaction of the BIC criterion between 2 NL BFs, if the SAC criterion is applied to the output BF = BF1 XOR BF2. The BIC criterion on BF1 and BF2 together is said to be satisfied, if the SAC criterion presented in Sec. 2.3 above on one BF, is satisfied within a range of 40% to 60% of output bits of BF, instead of just 50%. Algorithmically one can write the BIC criterion on BF as follows: Here the BIC criterion on BF1 and BF2 is considered to be satisfied, if any one of the four N's lies between 6 and 10. For an S-Box having 4 non-linear BFs, one has to look for satisfaction of BIC criterion for 6 set of 2 BFs. The BIC results of all the 32 DES S-Boxes are shown in column 14 of Table 1 [32].
Differential Cryptanalysis (DC) of DES S-Boxes
The differential cryptanalysis (DC) of S-Box endeavors to record the number of various output difference patterns that arises due to the fixed input difference in a Differential Distribution Table ( 
Linear Cryptanalysis of DES S-Boxes.
The basic idea of Linear Cryptanalysis of S-Box is to see if a linear relationship of its sixteen 4-bit inputs (Xi) exists with its sixteen 4-bit outputs (Yj). Matsui [14] first introduced the idea of Linear Cryptanalysis in 1994 by devising a mechanism to look for linear relationship between input and output of DES ciphers. Heys [31] in a tutorial considering the idea of linear cryptanalysis of Matsui, proposed a Linear Approximation Table ( LAT) for linear cryptanalysis of a 4-bit S-Box. One should note that for a particular input, there are 16 entries in the LAT for all the output patterns and for a particular output, there are identical entries in the LAT for all input patterns. The number of times (Cij) the linear relationship between a particular input and a particular output is satisfied is recorded [14] and the numbers (Nij) beyond 8 are appropriately entered in the LAT. An entry in the LAT becomes zero if Nij = 8, and for such entry the probability of a linear relationship between a particular input and output in the S-Box is ½. If the number of zeros in the LAT is more than 50%, one can conclude that for majority of cases no predictable linear relation between inputs and outputs exists and the S-Box is LC resistant. The algorithm to execute the linear cryptanalysis for 4-bit SBoxes following Heys [31] 
Strict Avalanche Criterion of S-Boxes.
One 4-bit S-Box is composed of four 16-bit Boolean Functions, bf0, bf1, bf2 and bf3 and according to Kim If all entries in (16 x 16) D-matrix is found to 8, the given SBox is SAC satisfied and cryptographically strong.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The computational results of 32 DES S-Boxes divided in 8 groups, each group having four, are presented in Table 1 [32] in four pages, with two groups in one page. It is noted that of all the required 128 BFs, 102 are non-repeating and 13 pairs are repeating ones and all 115 are balanced and nonlinear. Among the repeating 13 pairs, 10 have the nonlinearity 4, while the rest 3 have 2. Of the 102 non-repeating BFs, 82 have the non-linearity 4, while the rest 20, have 2. The 13 BF pairs with non-linearity 2, of which 3 are repeating ones, do not satisfy SAC, as defined by Travares [21] , while the 102 BFs with non-linearity 4, of which 10 are the repeating ones do satisfy the SAC. The 4-bit ANF coefficient {a14}, of all the 115 BFs is absent and does not contribute to non-linearity. All the S-Boxes satisfy the BIC as defined by Travares [21] and also satisfy DC as defined by Biham and Shamir [13] and the result of DC lies between 162 and 174. All S-Boxes except the S-Box 12 do not satisfy LC as defined by Matsui [14] since all assume results less than 128, except the one assuming 131. Following Travares [21] , a BF is considered to satisfy SAC if it becomes SAC proof with respect one of the four input vectors. If one considers the Travares's condition of BFlevel SAC and imposes a condition that one of the four BFs of an S-Box satisfies Travares's SAC, as the necessary condition for the S-Box to satisfy SAC, all the 32 DES SBoxes are found to satisfy S-Box-level SAC. However, Kim, Matsumoto and Imai [29] considered a BF SAC-proof when the concerned BF satisfies SAC with respect to all the four input vectors. They also considered an S-Box to satisfy SAC if all its four BFs independently satisfy their BF-level SAC. Following the SAC proposed by Kim, Matsumoto and Imai [29] , Sokolov [30] demonstrated that a 4-bit S-Box and a 8-bit S-Box do satisfy the SAC. The proposed SAC test of all the DES S-Boxes has been undertaken and it is found that no SBoxes satisfy the S-Box-Level SAC [32] . In fact, it is found that no BF of the 32 DES S-Boxes satisfy the BF-level SAC conditions proposed by Kim, Matsumoto and Imai.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The DES S-Boxes are so designed that all of them become resistant to Differential Cryptanalysis and Bit Independence Criterion of 4-bit S-boxes. The present analysis indicates that the designers of DES S-Boxes had the complete knowledge of 4-bit BFs and the S-Box-level Bit Independence Criterion and Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes, but not of the SBox-level Linear Cryptanalysis and Strict Avalanche Criterion. It seems that out of the 12870 balanced and 4-bit BFs, there should be sufficient BFs with non-linearity 4, such that no BFs with non-linearity 2 need not to be considered. Probably the compulsion to choose 26 BFs with non-linearity 2, was the need to make all the DES S-Boxes resistant to Bit Independence Criterion and Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes. In order to resolve such a riddle, it is necessary to approach design of 4-bit S-Boxes in a comprehensive manner from the BF and ANF angles.
